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Foreign Investment in a Least Developed Country:  
The Nepalese Experience 
 
 
Abstract: This paper aims to contribute to the literature on the developmental role of foreign 
direct investment through an examination of the Nepalese experience during the period 1988-
2001.  Despite significant liberalisation of the foreign investment regime and the introduction 
of attractive investment incentives, Nepal’s achievements during this period, both in terms of 
the volume of FDI and its developmental impact, failed to mach the national expectations.  
Nepal obviously has intrinsic disadvantages arising from its geography and other 
typographical characteristics in attracting FDI.  However, comparative international 
experience suggests that her lackluster achievements as a host to foreign investors cannot be 
explained in terms of these factors alone.  Policies that underpin the overall investment 
climate also seem to matter.  Mere liberalisation of the investment regime and introducing 
financial incentives are not a substitute for an all-encompassing effort to improve the 
investment climate. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The past two decades have witnessed a profound shift in the policy emphasis on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in developing countries (DCs).  In a significant departure from the 
scepticism about the developmental role FDI that pervaded policy thinking in the nearly three 
decades following the end of the Second World War, more and more countries have become 
increasingly receptive to FDI as an integral element of outward-oriented policy reforms.  
Despite this notable policy shift, the literature on the role of FDI in developing countries still 
remains both sparse and lopsided.  The few available analyses have focussed almost 
exclusively on the experience of the middle- and upper-middle income developing countries, 
in particular the high-performing countries in East Asia.  Policy inferences coming from this 
literature are of limited value for latecomers because the role of FDI vary across countries 
depending on changes in the process of internationalisation of production and the nature and 
timing of policy shifts, and the initial conditions of the given host country such as the degree 
of industrial advancement and the stage of entrepreneurial development.   This paper aims to 
redress this balance in the literature by examining the patterns and developmental 
implications of FDI in Nepal following the market-oriented policy reforms initiated in the 
mid 1980s. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an analytical account of the 
nature, determinants, and developmental implications of FDI in latecomer countries in order 
to place the Nepalese case study in context.  An overview of the foreign investment regime is 
provided in Section 3.  Section 4 examines trends and patterns of FDI during 1988-20011, 
while development implications of FDI are discussed in Section 5.   The key findings are 
summarised in the concluding section (Section 6).  
 
                                                 
1   The time coverage of the study ends in 2001 because the escalation of the civil war has severely disrupted 
FDI inflows to Nepal in the subsequent years. 
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2. Analytical Context 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) originates from the decision of a multinational enterprise 
(MNE) to relocate part of its activities in a selected host country.2  This decision is 
underpinned by the desire to reap benefits from its specific advantages (in the form of 
technology, managerial expertise, marketing know-how etc.), which cannot be effectively 
leased or purchased through ‘arms length’ market dealings with unrelated firms. In other 
words, FDI is a flow of long-term capital based on long-term profit considerations and a 
significant degree of influence by the investor on the management of the enterprise  (Caves 
1996). It is this specific element of ‘influence and control’ that distinguishes direct from 
portfolio investment and other forms of international capital flows.  
 
The most obvious contribution of FDI and other forms of international private capital 
flows (such as portfolio investment, bank credit) to a capital receiving (host) country is to 
increase domestic investment beyond the level permitted by domestic saving. However, FDI 
is unique among other forms of capital follow because its role is not limited only to adding to 
investment in the capital receiving (host) country. FDI originates from the decision of a firm 
in a given country (a multinational enterprises, MNEs) to enter into international production; 
to relocate part of its activities in a selected host country. Thus FDI essentially brings with it 
some firm-specific knowledge (in the form of technology, managerial expertise, marketing 
know-how etc.) that cannot be effectively leased or purchased on the market by the host 
country. Affiliates of MNEs as part of the parent company's global network, have marketing 
channels in place, possess experience and expertise in the many complex facets of product 
development and international marketing, and are well placed to take advantage of inter-
country differences in the costs of production. Moreover, MNEs may be better able to resist 
protectionist pressures in their home countries in such a way as to favour imports from their 
affiliates. On these grounds, it is often being said that FDI enables managers and workers in 
the country to acquire knowledge and technology faster than otherwise be possible. It may 
also allow new entrants to learn about export markets, stimulate competition with local firms, 
and provide training for workers.   There is a consensus in the literature that cumulative 
impact of these various spill over benefits of FDI is far greater than the direct benefits in the 
form of augmenting domestic investment (eg. Markusen and Venables 1997, Borensztein et 
al. 1998).  
 
The attractiveness of a given country as a host to foreign investors is determined 
through a combination of its comparative advantage in international production and the 
domestic investment climate.  The term ‘investment climate’ is sued here in a broader sense 
to cover both the foreign investment regime (rules governing foreign investment and specific 
incentives for investors) and the general investment environment which encompasses various 
considerations impinging on investment decisions such as political stability, macroeconomic 
environment and attitudes of host countries towards foreign enterprise participation.  Most 
economists today accept the argument that tax concessions and other profit-related incentives 
do not generally work unless they are appropriately combined with other initiatives to 
improve the general investment climate.  These specific incentives are relevant for an 
investment decision only if the general business environment is conducive for making profit. 
Moreover, as countries compete for attracting investment, the incentives offered by a given 
country are generally counter-balanced by similar moves by other competing countries. Thus 
                                                 
2 According to the standard (United Nations) definition, the multinational enterprise (MNE) is an enterprise that 
owns and controls business ventures in more than two countries, including its home country. When this 
definition is adopted the bulk (if not all) of FDI in a given country can be considered as MNE investment. 
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investment incentives may matter only when other conditions are roughly similar as between 
alternative host countries (Wells 1986, Wellas and Allen 2001, Caves 1996).  
Assuming a favourable investment environment, what are the typographical 
characteristics, which determine a country’s comparative advantage in international 
production?   In answering this question, it is important to emphasise that FDI is not a 
homogeneous phenomenon, but complicated and finely differentiated means of globalisation 
of production.  For the purpose of discussing factors impacting on foreign firms’ 
(Multinational Enterprises, MNEs) decision to locate production in a given country, it is 
important to distinguish between three categories of MNEs affiliates in terms of their 
operations in a given host country. These are, producers largely engaged in serving the 
domestic market (‘market-seeking’ investors), firms involved in extraction and processing of 
natural resources both for selling in the domestic market and exporting (usually for the latter 
purpose) (resource seekers), and those engaged in production for the global market 
(‘efficiency seeking’ investors). 
 
When it comes to market-seeking investment in developing countries, the forces 
explaining the location decisions of MNEs are about the same as those explaining their presence 
in industrialised countries.  The location decision depends primarily on the prevalence of 
production opportunities in the host country for meeting domestic demand.  Given the scale 
economies and very small domestic markets in many developing countries, a major (if not the 
key) determinant of FDI is restrictions on international trade (known as 'tariff jumping' motive).   
The so-called ‘life-cycle’ investors who expand their production networks globally 
predominantly on scale-economy and efficiency considerations hardly find low-income 
countries as attractive investment locations under free-trade conditions.  In theory, under certain 
circumstances, MNE affiliates originally set up to serve local markets could well develop 
competitive advantage over the years and penetrate markets in other countries without 
government support.  But in the real world such cases are rare and limited predominantly, if 
not solely, to middle-income and upper-middle-income developing countries with sizeable 
domestic market. 
 
The role of MNEs in ‘efficiency seeking’ investment is ‘more distinctively a 
developing-country question’ (Caves 1996, p217). For the purpose of identification of the 
potency of a given host country in attracting export-oriented FDI, it is important to 
distinguish between two different categories of export-oriented (EO) production, namely 
labour-intensive final consumer goods (clothing, footwear, toys, spot goods etc.), and 
assembly processes within vertically integrated global production systems.   
 
For the typical developing economy, labour-intensive consumer goods are generally 
considered the natural starting point in the process of export-led industrialisation.  However, 
the role of FDI in this area remains a controversial issue. In the spectacular export take-off of 
the East Asia NIEs in the 1960s, the key role was played by indigenous firms with the help of 
marketing services provided by foreign buyers - the Japanese trading houses and the large 
retail buying groups in developed countries (Nayyar 1978).   
 
There are, however, strong reasons to argue that this ‘early East Asian pattern’ of 
local-entrepreneur dominance in exports may not be replicated in latecomer countries for two 
reasons.  First, perhaps the most important factor behind the East Asian experience was the 
unique entrepreneurial background of these countries. Hong Kong, Taiwan and to some 
extent Singapore started with a stock of entrepreneurial and commercial talents inherited 
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from the pre-revolution industrialisation in China. Hong Kong and Singapore also had well 
established international contacts based upon entrepot trade that involved exporting 
manufactured goods to begin with. Likewise, the considerable industrial experience that 
accumulated over the preceding five decades or so under the Japanese occupation was 
instrumental in Korea's export take off. Therefore, there was no such a large difference 
between domestic firms in these countries and foreign firms with regard to knowledge of and 
access to production technologies and market channels. However, the initial level of 
entrepreneurial maturation in newcomer countries is generally not comparable to that of the 
NIEs. In many of these countries, the import-substitution growth strategy pursued 
indiscriminately over a long period has thwarted the development of local entrepreneurship.  
Domestic firms are generally weakly oriented towards, and have limited knowledge of, 
highly competitive export markets.    
 
Second, from around the mid 1980s, successful exporting firms in the East Asian 
NIEs have began to play an important role as direct investors in the latecomers’ labour-
intensive export industries.3  A major advantage which investors from these new countries 
possess is that, unlike MNEs from developed countries they are familiar with and/or easily 
adaptable to the more difficult business conditions (eg. poor infrastructure, bureaucratic red 
tape, and unpredictable policy settings) in latecomers.   Given that NIE firms have developed 
considerable specialised knowledge of small scale and labour-intensive production 
procedures in the manufacture of standardised products, they have a powerful competitive 
advantage over both local firms and MNEs from ICs in these latecomer environments. There 
are indications that, consistent with rapid structural transformations that are taking place in 
the NIEs prior to the recent economic crisis (and from which they have quickly recovered), 
this intermediary role of these "new" investors in linking latecomers to world markets may 
become increasingly important in years to come.   
  
 The production of relatively labour intensive components and their assembly within 
vertically integrated international industries  (‘international product fragmentation’ or 
‘outsourcing’) in developing countries has been an important feature of the international 
division of labour since about the late 1960s.  The process was started by electronics 
manufacturing MNEs based in the USA in response to increasing pressures of domestic real-
wage increases and rising import competition from low cost sources. The transfer abroad of 
component assembly operations now occurs in many industries where the technology of 
production permits the separation of labour intensive components from other stages of 
production. Assembly operations in the electronic industry (in particular assembly of semi-
conductor devices, hard disk drives etc) are still by far the most important. The other 
industries with significant assembly operations located in developing countries are electrical 
appliances, automobile parts, electrical machinery and optical products, musical equipment, 
watches, and cameras. In general, industries that have the potential to break up the production 
process to minimise the transport cost involved are more likely to move to peripheral 
countries than other heavy industries.    
 
 The expansion of overseas assembly operations as an important facet of international 
production has been hastened by two mutually reinforcing development over the past few 
decades. First, rapid advancements in production technology have enabled the industry to 
                                                 
3 Two main factors accounted for this trend: the erosion of international competitiveness of labour-intensive 
export products from their home countries as a result of rising real wages and exchange rates; and the imposition 
and gradual tightening of quantitative import restrictions (QRs) under the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) by 
Industrialised countries on certain labour intensive exports (mostly textile, garments and footwear) 
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slice up the value chain into finer, ‘portable’, components. Second, technological innovations 
in communication and transportation have shrunk the distance that once separated the world’s 
nations, and improved speed, efficiency and economy of coordinating geographically 
dispersed production process   There is evidence that global assembly exports is growing 
much faster than total manufactured exports (Freenstra 1998). 
 
While the availability of cheap and trainable labour is a prerequisite for attracting FDI 
into both these product areas, in worldwide assembly operations labour costs, generally take 
second place. The availability of a wider array of complementary inputs, including operator, 
technical and managerial skills (in addition to the availability of cheap operational labour), a 
good domestic basis of supplies and communication services, and high-quality infrastructure are 
crucial to make assembly operations efficient by world standards.  Also, given the heavy initial 
fixed costs involved, MNEs are hesitant to establish assembly plants  in a given host country 
without considerable experience and confidence in policy continuity and political stability in that 
country.  For these reasons, so far only a limited number of developing countries, mostly the 
high-performing East Asian countries and more recently some transition economies in Eastern 
Europe, have been able to attract FDI in assembly operation. 
 
Based on the above typology of FDI, what are the opportunities available for 
attracting FDI?   Nepal does not possess readily accessible mineral resources to attract 
resource-based FDI.   Her ability to attract ‘natural’ (purely market driven) import-
substitution FDI is also limited given the limited domestic market.   Enticing import-
substitution FDI through erecting tariff barriers is a non-option given the palpable shift in 
overall development policy towards greater outward orientation.   In the area of export-
oriented FDI, Nepal is not an attractive location for assembly activities within vertically 
integrated global industries.  Nepal opportunities in this area are basically limited to labour 
intensive consumer goods production.  However, Nepal’s attractiveness as a location of 
export-oriented FDI is significantly impeded by high transport cost arising from her 
‘landlockness’.  Apart form the long distance to Indian ports (the Calcutta post is about 1000 
kilometres at the closest route), inefficiencies of the Indian railway and ports add to Nepal’s 
cost of transportations relating to international trade. It is also widely alleged that shipments 
from Nepal receive unfair treatments in priority order at the highly congested Indian ports.4    
The original market-oriented policy reform package contained a proposal to establish dry 
ports in Brigun and Bhairabha and to develop a railway line from these ports to the Indian 
border with a view to relaxing the transport cost constraint on foreign trade.   This proposal 
has not yet taken off the planning stage. 
 
3. Foreign Investment Regime and Investment Climate in Nepal  
For over three decades until the mid-1980s Nepal continued to pursue import-substitution 
development strategy in the context of a highly protectionist trade and investment regime.  
During this period, FDI was allowed only in some selected industries.  There were also 
stringent limits on share of foreign ownership.   Dismal economic performance under the 
import-substitution regime, coupled with pressure by international lending agencies, paved 
the way for a decisive policy shift in favour of market-oriented, outward-looking, 
development strategy, starting with the Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) package of 1985. 
These reforms emphasised the need to promote the role of private sector in the economy.   
                                                 
4 According to some tentative estimate the additional cost disadvantaged faced by Nepalese exporter compared 
to their counterparts in countries in the region is around 7% of the FOB value. The Nepalese clothing exporters 
claim that their overall cost disadvantage compared to their competitors amounts to 20 to 25% (Bagchi 1998). 
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As a part of outward-oriented policy reforms, Nepal has made substantial changes in 
its trade and investment policies to promote private foreign investment as an effective means 
of promoting private-sector led growth.  The Industrial Policy and Industrial Enterprise Act 
promulgated in 1987 (Government of Nepal 1987) marked the beginning of Nepal’s attempt 
to attract FDI.  The Act provided a legal framework for facilitating FDI in medium and large-
scale ventures in every industry with the exception of environment and defence related 
activities. A new Foreign Investment Promotion Division was created at then the Ministry of 
Industry to act as the central body for the approval and monitoring of foreign investment 
projects. Foreign investment was not allowed in small-scale industries while in medium-sized 
industries, foreign equity of up to 50% was permitted. In large industries with at least 90% 
export sales there would be 100% foreign ownership. In other large industries 80% was 
normally the maximum; if the remaining 80 per cent of equity was not taken by Nepalese, 
foreign shareholders were could subscribe up to 100%. 
 
The Act contained a new set of incentives, which were similar to or even more 
attractive than those in other countries.  Full remittance of profits from FDI ventures in 
convertible currency was permitted. Repatriation of capital was possible, but an annual limit 
of 20% of the initial investment was set (or 25% if shares are sold through the Securities 
Exchange centre).  Employment of foreign workers was allowed if domestic workers were 
not available.  A five-year tax holiday was introduced for export oriented projects. 
 
The democratic government that came into power in 1990 re-emphasised the 
importance of FDI and technology transfer in the development process. In 1991 the tax 
holiday period was extended to10 years for investments in national priority activities. The 
priority sectors were defined to include industries producing goods that meet basic need 
(food, clothing and housing and so forth), export promotion activities (where exports are 50% 
or more of total sales) and hotels and tourist projects.  The Foreign Investment and 
Technology Transfer Act of 1992 opened up foreign investment in all sectors excepting some 
industries such as defence, cigarettes, bidis and alcohol.  Development of hydropower was 
also opened to foreign investment.  The Act guaranteed 100% repatriation of equity invested, 
dividends obtained from foreign investment and amount received as payment of principal and 
interest on foreign loans in convertible currencies.   
 
Under the Foreign Investment and One-Window Policy Act (1992) the approval and 
licensing procedures were simplified with a view to approving investment applications within 
a stipulated time period of 30 days following the receipt of the application. A One window 
Committee was set up at the Ministry of Industries to attend to the provision of all 
institutional facilities and services (infrastructure-related and other) under one roof.  As part 
of the FDI policy, the Nepalese government has entered into investment protection 
agreements with Germany, France and the UK.  Agreements for avoiding double taxation 
have been signed with India, Norway and Thailand.  Relating to the settlement of foreign-
investment related disputes, the law of the country has made explicit provisions for 
arbitration within the framework of the United nation’s Commission for International Law 
(UNCTRAL)  
 
The Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act of 1992 contained a ban on the 
entry of FDI into cottage industries and projects with fixed assets amounting to less than 20 
million Nepalese rupees. A 1996 amendment eliminated the fixed assets limit and expanded 
the scope of foreign investment in all industries except those few in the negative list.  To 
expedite the approval process, the Dept of Industry was authorised to approve projects with 
Rs 500 millions or more fixed assets. 
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More recent changes in foreign investment law include, abolishing tax holiday (by the 
first amendment to the foreign investment act in 1997) and reduction of corporate tax rate for 
domestic marker-oriented manufacturing and services to 20%.  Export oriented ventures have 
the option of either paying corporate tax at the rate of  0.5% of export value (FOB) or 8% of 
profit.  A 5% tax was introduced on profit remittances by foreign firms by the 1999/2000 
Budget.   This new tax, introduced on balance of payments exigencies, is however at odds 
with the government commitment to promote foreign investment. 
 
The key elements of the Nepalese FDI policy are compared with that of the other 
countries in South Asia in Table 1.  It is evident that in general Nepalese policy regime 
compares very favourably with the other countries.  However, it is important to note two 
peculiarities in the Nepalese regime.   First, after the 1997 amendment to the investment Act, 
Nepal does not offer tax holiday for foreign investment project.  Second, Nepal has not set up 
export processing zones(EPZ) as a means of promoting export-oriented FDI.  The Nepalese 
authorities are of the view that there is little need for EPZ given the significant import tariff 
cuts in recent years and the existence of the wide-ranging import duty rebate scheme.  
 
There is no doubt that Nepal has gone a long way in liberalising investment policy.  
However, very little reforms have taken in factor markets in particular the labour market. For 
example, under the Labour Act, 1992 firing a worker is extremely difficult and costly. 
Likewise, the existing policy does not encourage firm specific training programs despite the 
importance of such programs in the organised manufacturing sector. Electricity distribution is 
still regulated by the state own enterprises namely, Nepal electricity Authority which suffer 
from inefficiency and poor management.  Despite considerable potential for producing hydro-
electricity, the country suffers from chronic shortages of electricity.  In the late 1990s, on 
average almost half of the production capacity in domestic manufacturing remained 
unutilised due to shortage of electricity (Sharma 2001).    
 
4. FDI: Trends and Patterns 
During 1988-2001, the Foreign Investment Board approved a total of 721 projects. Total 
capital commitment of these projects amounted to US$ 1153.6 million (Nepalese Rupees 
(NR) 65191 million) of which US$ 971.6 (26.3% of the total) came in the form of capital 
contribution by the foreign partners of the projects.  It was envisaged (planned) that these 
investments will generate 86,425 jobs (Table 2). Foreign investment approval showed a 
steady increase from 1988 to 1996, with the exception of 1994 when there was a temporary 
dip in due to uncertainty in the political climate (with the formation of a short-lived 
communist government).  Since 1997, foreign investment approval pattern has been erratic, 
with all years except 2000 recording a decline compared to the levels in the mid-1990.  
 
The available data indicate that only about 37% of the approved projects are 
operational (Table 2). While it is a universal pattern across all developing investment-
receiving countries that a significant number of FDI projects never reach the implementation 
stage, the Nepalese realisation rate is exceptionally low from a comparative perspective.   For 
instance, the realisation rates in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Vietnam (for varying periods during 
the decades of 1980s and 1990s) have been estimated as 80%, 75% and 70%  (Athukorala 
and Menon 1996, Athukorala and Rajapatirana 2000, Kokko and Zejan 1996).  This may be 
because of various administrative bottlenecks that the prospective investors have to confront 
in Nepal. 
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As discussed earlier, Nepal now allows full ownership in FDI projects, with 
ownership limits only in few areas.  Despite this, the share of foreign capital in total approved 
investment during 1988-2001 has averaged to a mere 26.3%, with the share in annual 
approvals varying in the range of 8% to 54%.  Based on the experience of other developing 
countries, the apparent inclination of foreign investors to settle for partial, mostly minority, 
ownership positions perhaps points to the unsettled nature of the investment environment in 
the country. 
 
Table 3 places Nepal’s performance in attracting FDI in international perspective.  
Among the South Asian countries, Nepal’s performance both in term of the volume and the 
trends in FDI inflow is superior only to Bhutan.  It is generally belied that Nepal is in a less 
advantageous position in attracting FDI because of its landlockedness.  But even in a 
comparison with other land-locked least-developed countries for which data are available, 
Nepal stands out to be a ‘below-average’ performer.  While it is not possible to draw firm 
inferences from a simple inter-country comparison, the data reported in the table do suggest 
that Nepal’s poor record in attracting FDI cannot  be explained solely in terms of 
landlockness.     
 
The geographic origin of FDI in Nepal is characterised by a clear developing country 
bias (Table 4).   Among the developing country investors, India has been by far the most 
important largest investor in Nepal.  Of the total number of approved projects, 249 are of 
Indian parentage.  A large number of these firms are ‘quota-hoppers; in the export-oriented 
garment industry, firms set up in order to circumvent quota restrictions imposed by importing 
developed countries on garment exports from India. A major inducement for the bulk, if not 
all, of the other Indian investors has been opportunities for profit making through ‘import 
deflection’. Because of successive tariff cuts form the late 1980s, tariffs on many 
intermediate products imports in Nepal are much lower than in India. This, combined with 
virtual open border between the two countries, has made simple processing industries in a 
number of product area (including vegetable ghee, copper wires  and some cosmetics) geared 
to the Indian market highly profitable.   
 
An overwhelming number of projects with capital participation from developed 
countries are small-scale projects with the participation of individual (rather than business) 
investors.  None of the well know MNEs from the developed countries appear on the 
approval list of the Nepalese investment authority.   Moreover, FDI from developed countries 
are mostly in the service sector.  
 
 Data on the sectoral distribution of approved projects are summarised in Table 5. 
Manufacturing accounts for more than half of the approved projects and 65% of the total 
planned investment.  Among the other sectors, hotel and tourism show a large concentration 
given the attractiveness of Nepal as a tourist destination.  Only two foreign firms have so far 
entered the hydroelectricity sector where Nepal has immense potential for output expansion 
though foreign capital participation.5 The government monopoly in electricity distribution 
and the compulsion for private-sector electricity producers to supply to the national supply 
grid (owned and managed by the Nepalese Electricity Authority is considered to be a major 
hurdle for FDI in this sector. 
                                                 
5 Total hydropower generation potential in Nepal has been estimated at MW 83,000 and 50% of this is 
considered commercially viable. However, the current installed capacity is only MW 253, and only 25% of 
Nepalese households have access to electricity. Intermittent interruption of power supply is a major constraint 
on manufacturing and business activities.  
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Despite the heavy emphasis placed on attracting FDI as a vehicle for export 
expansion, much of the realised projects are engaged in domestic-market oriented product 
sectors (Table 6).  Of the 270 operational projects, 116 (43%) are in various services 
activities (mostly those relating to tourism).  Among 154 firms engaged in manufacturing, 
only 27 (18%) are in export-oriented industries, with the balance of 127 (82%) producing 
predominantly for the domestic market.  Thus, clearly Nepal’s record in attracting efficiency 
enhancing FDI has so far been rather limited. Various deficiencies in investment climate, 
such as lack of flexibility in labour market and the low quality of  physical infrastructure 
appear to be the main reasons (Sharma 2004). As can be expected, the export-oriented firms 
show a greater concentration in Kathmandu valley compared to domestic market oriented 
forms.  None of the export-oriented firms are located in the hilly and mountain regions (Table 
6). 
 
The bulk of export-oriented FDI projects are in the clothing industry (about 95), 
driven by country-specific import quotas imposed by importing countries under the Multi-
fibre Arrangement (MFA).   Thus, the sustainability of these projects is in doubt when the 
quotas are abolished under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.  Perhaps because 
of the uncertain business climate, foreign firms in the export-oriented garment industry have 
largely focused on reaping easy, short-term gains in a quota-restricted market without making 
effort to diversify into competitive non-quota markets. According to tentative estimates based 
on interviews conducted with some key informants in the business sector, in 2001 the non-
quota exports accounted for only about 10 percent of total garment exports from Nepal 
(UNIDO 2002). 
 
5. Developmental Implications 
A systematic analysis of the developmental implications of FDI in Nepal is not possible 
because of data deficiencies.  The Annual Survey of Manufacturing Establishments,  which is 
the main source of data for analysing manufacturing performance, does not provide for cross-
tabulation of data by ownership.  The foreign investment approval authority has not so far 
undertaken any assessment of the operations of foreign investment projects.  The following 
tentative inferences are made by combining the limited available data and inferences of the 
studies on the development role of FDI in developing countries. 
 
Data from Foreign Investment Board records indicate that operational foreign firms 
have created 41,310 jobs during 1988-2001 periods, which amounted to a mere 0.06 per cent 
of the total labour force in the country. Of this 28,400 jobs were in manufacturing (or 70% of 
the total), while the rest were in services activities (12,910).  
 
This lacklustre employment outcome is not only a reflection of the county’s limited 
success in attracting a sizeable number of FDI projects but also of the nature of the projects 
that have been set up in the country.   The data on the sectoral distribution of FDI projects in 
manufacturing points to a high concentration of projects in relatively more capital-intensive 
sectors, which receive relatively high protection.  Based on data relating to investment 
approval, total investment per worker in FDI projects is around US$ 14,000, which is 
extraordinarily high for a labour surplus and capital scarce country like Nepal. For example, 
in Malaysia, a country which is at a much advanced level of development with virtually full 
employment from the early 1990s, average investment per worker in foreign firms is as low 
as US$18,000. This vast difference in the degree of capital intensity of production by foreign 
firms in the two countries can be explained in terms of the nature of market-orientation of 
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such production.   As noted earlier, foreign firms in Nepal are overwhelmingly involved in 
import-substitution activities where as in Malaysia they are heavily concentrated in export-
oriented production.   Export-oriented (or efficiency seeking) FDI in developing countries, 
being driven mostly by relative factor cost differentials, naturally tends to be more labour 
intensive compared to market seeking FDI.6  
 
The heavy concentration of foreign firms in Nepal in market seeking activities also 
suggests that national gains from FDI in productivity improvement and economic growth 
may have been limited.  Firms set up to cater for the domestic market tends to have high costs 
and characterised by low productivity growth compared to those set up to produce for the 
global market in line with the country’s comparative advantage in international production 
(Athukorala and Chand 2002, Balasubramanyam et al 1999).    
 
Date on the spatial distribution of operational FDI projects suggest that the benefits of 
FDI are heavily concentrated in Kathmandu and the surrounding areas.   Of the 270 operating 
projects, Kathmandu Valley alone has attracted 153 projects (57% of the total) and absorbs 
48% of total employment. By contrast, only 32 projects (12%) accounting for 14% of total 
employment are located in the Hilly and Mountain regions where about 50 percent of the 
country’s population live.  An analysis of employment generated by FDI firms by region 
suggests that over 86% of jobs are created in Kathmandu Valley and Terai belt both of which 
have the basic physical infrastructure and the high purchasing than the rest of the country 
(Table 7). These two regions have together attracted 238 operational FDI (or 88% of the 
total). These special patterns of FDI location clearly points to the importance of 
transportation and other infrastructure facilities, and access to administrative services in 
determining investment location. 
 
6. Conclusion  
Nepal has made a promising start in implementing market-oriented reform and promoting 
FDI as part of it, but it has a long way to go in reaping the benefits from the greater global 
integration through FDI. There is no doubt that since the introduction of an outward-oriented 
strategy in the mid 1980s foreign firms have contributed significantly in carpets and 
readymade garment exports but their exports are largely motivated by the GSP and MFA 
quotas rather than the country’s intrinsic comparative advantage. Also, a large number of 
foreign firms are based on a shaky foundation, motivated by import deflection opportunities 
created by vast tariff differential between Nepal and India (the major investor in Nepal). 
Foreign firms are relatively capital-intensive as compared with local firms. These firms 
employs only about 0.6% of economically active workforce which is not impressive in a 
labour abundant country like Nepal where about 20% of the work force is unemployed or 
underemployed. This lower level of employment intensity in foreign firms appears to be due 
the rigidity in labour market and shortage of semi-skilled workforce.  
 
In the absence of basic prerequisites (namely, efficient and reliable physical 
infrastructure and access to semi-skilled work force), the geographic spread of gains from 
foreign firms has been rather lopsided. Most foreign firms are located in the Kathmandu 
Valley or in Terai belt while Hilly and Mountain ranges have failed to attract such investment 
due to poor physical infrastructure facilities despite liberalisation in trade and investment 
climate. An obvious, but important, inference coming from our analysis is that trade 
                                                 
6  See Bhagwati (2004) Chapter 12 and the work cited therein. 
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liberalisation and generous investment per se in the absence of basic pre-conditions cannot 
achieve anticipated developmental objectives..  The provision of required supportive services, 
political stability, policy certainty and a flexible administrative mechanism have an equally, 
and perhaps even more, important role to play.  This is also reflected by the low realisation 
rate of FDI firms (about 46%).  
 
Nepal obviously has intrinsic disadvantages arising from its geography in attracting 
FDI. However, comparative international experience suggests that her lacklustre record as a 
host to foreign investors cannot be explained in terms of geography alone.   The overall 
investment climate also seems to matter. 
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Table 1: Foreign Investment Policy Regimes in South Asian Countries 
 
Source: Complied  from various country sources.
Areas Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
Govt. Agency dealing 
with FDI  
Board of Investment Foreign Investment Promotion 
Board and Council 
Investment Promotion Board Board of Investment Board of Investment 
Limits on foreign 
Foreign Equity 
Participation 
100% Up to 51% in most industries; 
Up to 24% in small scale 
industries; 
and 100% in export-oriented 
industries, power, electronic 
and software technology parks 
100% foreign owned or joint 
venture in all sectors, except for a 
negative list industries 
100% without any permission 
of the Govt.  
100% 
Fiscal Incentives i) Tax holiday for industries 
located in Dhaka and 
Chittagong Division (for 5 
years), and Rajshahi, Khulna, 
Sylhet, and Barisal District (for 
7 years) 
ii) Tax exemption on royalties, 
interest on foreign loans and 
capital gains from the transfers 
of shares 
iii) 5% import duty on capital 
equipment and sparse parts for 
initial installation  
i) Income tax holiday of 10 year 
for EPZ firms and 5 year  for 
other investors. 
ii) Access to finance for export-
oriented industries at 
confessional interest rates 
iii) Tax relief under Avoidance 
of double taxation agreements 
iv)  10 year income tax holiday 
for firms located in EPZ. 
i) Corporate tax rate for export-
oriented industries is 8% of profit 
or 
0.5% of export earnings 
ii) Corporate tax rate for import 
competing industries is 20% 
iii) 2.5% duties on imports of M/E 
and spare parts 
iv) 5-10% duties on most 
industrial intermediate inputs 
refuded to export-oriented 
industries under the duty draw 
back scheme 
i) No custom duty on imports 
of plant, machinery & 
equipment for export-
oriented and hi-tech 
industries  
ii) zero import tariff on plant 
and machinery (not available 
locally) used for agriculture 
i) Exempted from income tax on 
capital gains arising from share 
transfers 
ii) income tax??? 
iii) Duty draw back for export-
oriented industries 
Repatriation of Profits 
and tax on expatriates 
income 
100% repatriation of capital and 
dividends is  allowed 
100% repatriation of capital, 
profits and dividend is allowed 
after payment of tax  
 
100% repatriation of dividents 
and capital is allowed 
100% repatriation of capital, 
dividend and profits is 
allowed 
i) 100% repatriation of profits and 
dividend is allowed 
ii) expatriates income is taxed at a 
confessional rate of 15% for 5 
years  
Infrastructure i) Provision of EPZs 
ii) Provision of industrial estates
ii) provision of  
EPZs 
ii) non-resident Indians allowed 
to acquire any property, except 
agricultural land, Farm House 
and Plantations  
i) Provision of 11 industrial 
estates 
ii) Self arrangement of land and 
utilities 
iii) Dry port in Birgunj, and 
international container depos in 
Biratnagar and Bhairawa are 
under construction 
i) Provision of EPZs 
 
i) Provision of EPZ 
Protection of Foreign 
Investment 
i) Guarantee  against 
nationalisation 
ii) Internatioanl convention for 
settlement  of industrial disputes 
i) Settlement of disputes is 
govern by the Indian 
Arbitaration  Act 1940 
ii) UN Convention for the 
recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards 
i) Guarantee against national  
ii) Dispute settlement through 
mutual consultations  and in 
accordance with the arbitration 
rules of UN Commission on 
International Trade Law 
i) Guarantee against 
nationalisation 
ii) Settlement of dispute 
through the International 
Commission on Settlement of 
Investment Disputes 
i) Protection against nationalisation 
under the bilateral investment 
agreements and constitutional 
guarantee 
ii) Internatioanl Convention for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes 
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Table 2: Status of Total Approved Investment Projects, 1988 - 2001 
 
 Year* No. of 
Projects 
Total Investment
(US$ million) 
Total Fixed 
Investment 
(US$ million) 
% Share of 
FDI in total 
investment 
Employment
 
Operational 270 536.1 479.2 18.7 41310 
Under-construction 49 82.0 73.1 30.3 6210 
Licensed 135 214.1 172.7 31.9 15399 
Agreement signed 183 182.6 126.0 39.9 13214 
Closed 19 17.4 14.4 24.1 1798 
Cancelled 65 121.4 106.1 27.1 8494 
Total Approved 721 1153.6 971.6 26.3 86425 
 
Note:  * Nepalese fiscal year, from 16 July of the previous to 15 July in the reported year. 
 
Source: Investment Promotion Board, Department of Industry, Commerce and Supplies, 
Kathmandu. 
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Table 3: FDI Inflows: Nepal in International Context, 1989-2002 
    1989-94* 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
          
World 
    
         
   
200145 331068 384910 481911 686028 179083 1392957 823825 651188
Developed countries 137124 203462 219688 269654 472265 824642 1120528 598379 460334
Developing countries 
 
63021 
 
127606
 
165222
 
212257
 
213763
 
-645559 
 
272429 
 
225446
 
190854
 
South Asia  817 2945 3685 4939 3504 3095 3092 3982 4581
Bangladesh  6 2 14 139 190 180 280 79 45
Bhutan  1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
India  394 2144 2591 3619 2633 2168 2319 3403 3449
Maldives  6 7 9 11 12 12 13 12 12
Nepal  4 8 19 23 12 4 0 21 10
Pakistan  304 719 918 713 507 530 305 385 823
Sri  Lanka  
 
102 65 133
 
433
 
150
 
201 
 
175 82 242
 
Land-locked LDCs 
Chad  13 13 18 44 21 27 115  901
Lao PDR 19 95 160 86 45 52 34 24 25
Lesotho  19 23 31 32 27 33 31 28 24
Malavi 12 25 44 -1 -3 46 -33 -20
Mali  2 123 47 74 36 51 83 122 102
Mongolia  71 10 16 25 19 30 54 43 78
Niger  17 16 20 25 9  9 23 8
Paraguay  79 98 144 236 342 95 104 95 -22
Uganda  23 121 121 175 210 222 254 229 275
Zambia  90 97 117 207 198 163 122 72 197
Zimbabwe  13 118 81 135 444 59 23 4 26
 
Notes: * Annual average  
 ** Estimate 
 - Negligible 
 … Not available 
 LDC Least-developed country. 
 
Source:  UNCTAD, World Investment Report, Geneva: United Nations (various years). 
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Table 4: Approved FDI Project by Source County 1988-2001 
 
 No. of 
Project 
Total 
Investment 
(US$ million)
Fixed 
Investment
(US$ 
million) 
FDI share in 
total investment 
(%) 
Employment
Developed Countries 309 425.9 380.5 25.6 27487 
Japan 77 40.6 35.0 32.0 4842 
USA 74 174.1 159.1 29.9 6915 
Germany 31 9.1 7.6 37.4 2262 
UK 26 27.7 23.8 8.1 5153 
France 19 6.4 5.5 23.6 993 
Other Developed Countries 82 167.6 149.2 22.0 7322 
High Performing Asian 
Economies 
119 197.5 169.6 29.9 14144 
China 57 113.6 95.2 29.1 6716 
S. Korea 29 22.6 18.7 49.1 2552 
Hong Kong 12 18.2 15.9 35.8 2064 
Singapore 8 23.9 23.1 20.7 1135 
Thailand 7 14.2 12.1 9.5 1106 
Taiwan 6 5.0 4.5 42.5 571 
      
SAARC Countries 271 430.3 330.9 26.1 40301 
India 249 419.7 324.9 25.9 34553 
Bangladesh 9 4.9 2.6 29.9 3401 
Pakistan 7 4.1 3.1 39.0 2166 
Sri Lanka 3 1.2 0.8 47.3 83 
Bhutan 3 0.4 0.3 13.2 98 
      
Other Developing Countries 22 99.9 90.6 26.2 4493 
Bermuda 6 29.8 25.3 5.9 1474 
British Virgin Island 4 51.3 49.3 37.3 1210 
Philippines 3 13.9 12.8 5.3 1329 
United Arab E. 1 2.7 0.6 25.2 93 
Others  8 2.2 2.6 29.0 387 
Total 721 1153.6 971.6 26.3 86425 
 
Source: Compiled from data from the Department of Industry, Commerce and Supplies 
 Kathmandu.  
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Table 5: Sectoral Distribution of Foreign Investment in Nepal, 1987- 2001  
 
Product sector 
 
 
 
Number of 
projects 
 
 
Total 
investment
(US$ 
million)*
Total fixed 
investment 
(US$ 
million)*
Share of FDI 
in total 
investment 
(%) 
 
Total 
employment
 
 
      
1. Agriculture 12 5.2 4.7 25.5 842 
2. Manufacturing 369 492.7 363.1 26.0 55996 
2.1    Food, beverages and tobacco 61 124.4 109.2 19.3 … 
2.2    Textile and wearing apparel 123 118.6 75.8 33.0 … 
2.3    Wood & wood products 5 1.2 0.9 34.0 … 
2.4     Paper & paper products 17 24.9 21.5 15.4 … 
2.5    Chemical and plastic products 68 89.8 67.1 30.7 … 
2.6    Non-metallic mineral products 13 46.6 27.7 20.9 … 
2.7    Basic metal products 21 30.2 20.4 30.8 … 
2.8    Fabricated metal products 48 44.8 31.6 25.4 … 
2.9    Machinery and equipment 0 0 0 0 … 
2.10   Other manufacturing  13 12.1 8.7 22.2 … 
3. Electricity, water and gas 14 243.4 230.2 17.1 … 
4. Construction 16 12.8 11.2 59.9 … 
5. Hotel & resorts 168 228.6 217.3 27.3 … 
6. Transport& communication 24 53.5 37.5 40.6 … 
7. Housing and apartments 15 3.6 1.4 56.1 … 
8. Services 104 103.6 96.1 33.2 … 
TOTAL 721 1153.6 971.6 26.3 86425 
 
.… Data not available. 
 
Source: Complied from data from the Department of Industry, Commerce and Supplies,    
 Kathmandu. 
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Table 6: Number of Operational FDI firms by Region and Market Orientation as at 
31.10.2001 
 
Region Manufacturing Service Total 
 
Domestic 
market-oriented
Export  
market-oriented   
Kathmandu Valley 53 21 74 148 
Terai 64 6 15 85 
Hilly and Mountain Range 10 - 27 37 
 
Total 127 27 116 270 
     
 
Source: Complied by authors from data provided by the Department of Industry, Commerce and 
Supplies, Kathmandu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Employment and Investment in Operational FDI firms by Region as at 
31.10.2001 
 
Region No of Project 
Total Project Cost 
(US$ million) Employment 
Kathmandu Valley 153 303.85 20049 
Terai 85 112.10 15612 
Hilly and Mountain Range 32 63.35 5649 
Total  270 479.30 41310 
 
Source: Complied by authors from data provided by the Department of Industry, Commerce and 
Supplies, Kathmandu. 
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